



CHART 1

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SUBJECT

- \* DISCUSSION OF FUTURE OF IDEALIST PROGRAM ON  
13 NOVEMBER 1968 AT EXCOM

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NRO review(s) completed.

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


CHART I

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There have been many indicators that the BOB will attempt to terminate the IDEALIST Program during the November ExCom meeting. This briefing has been prepared to apprise you of this concern and to prepare the CIA spokesman for rebuttal, if the need arises. Attendant with this briefing is a memorandum and a Black Book which contains factual data such as missions flown, yearly costs, etc.

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CHART 2

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INDICATORS

BOB - COMMENTS/REQUESTS

NRO - COMMENTS/REQUESTS

DOD - STUDY


CIA - NOTES/STUDY

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CHART II

INDICATORSBOB Comments/Requests:

For the past two years the BOB has mentioned at various hearings that they intend to discuss the future of the IDEALIST Program in conjunction with the SENIOR YEAR Program. The objective being a consolidation of effort or the termination of either or both Programs. The yardstick to be used would be dollars rather than operational necessity or Government overflight requirement.

The BOB, through the NRO, has requested certain background information and supplemental data related to the IDEALIST and SENIOR YEAR Programs. OSA has responded to these requests by answering only those questions related to missions and reasons for standdowns.

NRO Comments/Requests:

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25X1 [redacted] during a discussion with [redacted] suggested that OSA generate a paper defending the Program and giving reasons for continuing the Program, as it most likely would be a subject for discussion at the ExCom in November.

25X1 [redacted] further requested background information as to the number of missions flown, the reasons for standdown, and other pertinent information. Similar information has been requested

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for SENIOR YEAR and it becomes obvious that the BOB will raise the subject and through this medium suggest that the IDEALIST Program be terminated or curtailed.


DOD Preparation:

Mr. Nitze has requested the Secretary of the Air Force, JCS, DDR&E, etc., to prepare a paper by 1 November giving an assessment of the DOD Reconnaissance activity and related ExCom matters, including alternatives to the drone, U-2, SR-71 and the impact of such alternatives. This is obviously in preparation for a review of the DOD posture. It would be the basis for a suggested ExCom consideration of all reconnaissance activities at the ExCom November meeting. Also to be considered are noted comments by the DDCI and DDS&T that we should not plan any direct participation in the DOD study. The notes, however, do not preclude OSA preparing an in-house rebuttal to counter any suggested termination of the IDEALIST nor do they preclude OSA preparation of a paper reflecting statistics and policy involved in continuing the IDEALIST Program.

CIA Notes/Study:

Mr. Bross requested Mr. Duckett to prepare a memorandum stating the case in favor of active continued participation by CIA in the design, development, utilization and control

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of technical collection systems. This, of course, included the IDEALIST. It suggested a general survey which would envision proposals for organizational changes if required. The reply was prepared by OSA and forwarded to DD/S&T in early October.

In reality there is no formal study by CIA, but OSA is endeavoring to pinpoint the pros and cons of continuation of the IDEALIST Program. These are included in the background book and in the ensuing pages.

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PROBABLE BOB COMMENTS

PROPOSAL TO MAKE COMPARATIVE STUDY TO INCLUDE:

- OPERATIONAL HOURS
- NUMBER OF MISSIONS
- COST FACTORS
  - Per Hour
  - Per Mission
  - Per Photo Coverage
  - Per Base
- COVER
- SECURITY

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CHART III

BOB Comments:

The most likely introductory phrase by the BOB at the ExCom will be a proposal to make a comparative study of the IDEALIST, SENIOR YEAR, and other similar reconnaissance programs to determine if they could be integrated, dissolved, etc., or to prove that the cost effectiveness of the IDEALIST program is basically nil. Items that they would suggest be included would be operational hours, numbers of missions flown vs aircraft assigned; cost factors to include comparisons per flying hour, per mission, per foot of photo coverage, per unit or base, etc.

A statement that was used in the OXCART Study was that the Program was not really covert since CIA uses Air Force officers, military transport, equipment, military bases, etc.

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CHART 4

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SUGGESTED CIA POSTURE

DOLLAR DISCUSSIONS

FLYING HOUR AND MISSION COMPARISONS

BOB/DOD/CIA STUDY

STRESS THE FOLLOWING IF NEED ARISES:

Covert Method of Operation

Established Organization

Complementary Vs Competitive

Presidential Options

Aircraft Allocations

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


CHART IV

Dollar Discussions:

OSA is not knowledgeable of the source of pricing of the SENIOR YEAR and IDEALIST Programs as given by the BOB and NRO. The dollars quoted in the Black Book are factual. It is suggested that dollar discussions be avoided since the basis of the DOD and BOB figures are not reconcilable or compatible with those available to OSA. Items such as films, fuel, support aircraft, Federal supplies, etc., are not included and totals that could be quoted are misleading.


Flying Hours and Mission Comparisons:

CIA historically has logged "operational hours" only when engaged in an actual "mission". The Air Force logs "operational hours" for any flight ordered by higher headquarters, i.e. SAC, USAF, etc. By this means, the Air Force "logs" many times more operational hours than CIA. Also to be considered is their commitment over Cuba and SEA. It has been to the advantage of CIA to state that since the hours are logged with different ground rules, they cannot be compared.

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BOB/DOD/CIA Study:

The beginning of the end of the OXCART was a study whereby outside biased participants presupposed that the systems were similar and therefore two systems were not required. The dollar comparison was distorted and gave a false picture. It is suggested that if the ExCom suggests a study be made, that the CIA spokesman attempt to preclude this happening.

Aircraft Allocations:

The decision for the allocation of the U-2R aircraft was made by the Secretary of Defense and DDCI.

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
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COVERT METHOD OF OPERATION

PLAUSIBLE DENIAL

CIVILIAN INVOLVEMENT

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NON MILITARY TRAIL

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CHART V

Covert Method of Operation:

The significant point is that the Agency overflights with a civilian pilot provides a plausible out, short of declared war for the nation being overflown. This was proven in the Gary Powers case.

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Again, one of the most significant points is that there is a nonmilitary trail to follow back to the USA rather than a provocative military trail which could be considered as an Act of War.

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The White House insisted on including the IDEALIST Program



for security reasons.

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CHART 7

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COMPLEMENTARY OR COMPETITIVE

AGENCY - DOD

MUTUAL SUPPORT FOR

Procurement

Spares

Aircraft

Systems

Sensors

Development



Aircraft

Training

Crews

Maint. Personnel

Operations

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CHART VII

Complementary vs Competitive:

The Agency and DOD U-2 Programs are complementary and not competitive. There is mutual procurement, development, training and support for operations throughout the activities. Both units benefit from the Agency's capability for quick reaction, development, training facilities, etc. The point being that there is no contest or duel to see who can do the better job but in reality, they are supporting one another throughout the Program parameters.



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The results have been used by all DOD departments.

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CHART 8

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PRESIDENTIAL OPTIONS

OVERT VS COVERT

CIVILIAN VS MILITARY

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CHART VIII

Presidential Options:

Of great significance is the fact that the President in time of crisis can choose either his military arm or clandestine arm.

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RECOMENDATION

A STRONG POSITION BE TAKEN FOR CONTINUATION  
OF THE IDEALIST PROGRAM


PREVENT PROGRAM EMASCULATION BY ATTRITION  
OF DOLLARS, RESOURCES, AIRCRAFT, ETC.

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CHART IX

Recommendations:

It is suggested that if the DOD or BOB raises the issue of the IDEALIST Program at the November ExCom, that the position of the Agency be to prevent emasculation or dwindling of the IDEALIST assets so as to make meaningless the program's contributions to the national reconnaissance effort. Items such as continuous studies, limitations of aircraft, loss of dollars, and denial of new equipment should be guarded against. In the final analysis, it is suggested that a "use it or lose it" attitude be taken by CIA and if necessary, be transmitted to the ExCom members.

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7 November 1968

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Deputy Director for Science and Technology  
**SUBJECT:** Justification for Retention of the  
IDEALIST U-2 Program

1. This memorandum is for information only. It contains preliminary information and background data regarding the IDEALIST U-2 Program which is on the agenda for discussion at the forthcoming ExCom meeting. A more detailed background information book containing IDEALIST supporting documents and statistics is being prepared, and will be available for your review on Friday, 8 November 1968.
2. Recently several formal documents and informal conversations have indicated that the IDEALIST Program will be discussed at the November ExCom meeting. These discussions, sparked by either the BOB, the DOD, or both, will most likely examine the need for continuation of this program. For example: The BOB at both the 1967 and 1968 Budget Hearings, announced that they would make a point of discussing the IDEALIST Program in depth at the November 1968 ExCom meeting. The BOB further states that these in-depth discussions would be directed at determining whether the program merits continuation. It, therefore, well behooves the Agency to be prepared to not only discuss its IDEALIST

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Program, but to have arguments that a valid requirement still exists for continuation of this program.

3. It can be assumed that, in these forthcoming discussions, the arguments advocating discontinuation of the IDEALIST Program will be much the same as those used in the past. Indeed, some of these points were used successfully and effectively by BOB/DOD during the debates leading up to the demise of the OXCART Program. The following are salient examples from these now familiar arguments:

a. The cost of the program exceeds the value of the returns derived from it.

b. The USAF could perform these reconnaissance tasks as well and at less expense to the Government.

c. There is no longer a need to differentiate between civilian and military pilots for reconnaissance missions.

d. Two units (CIA-SAC) means duplication of costs and expenses.

e. The IDEALIST Program has, on an average, completed far less operational flying time and missions than the USAF, therefore, the USAF is doing more productive work and should be given all the U-2 resources.

3. Undoubtedly, there are numerous other views in the same vein that could be brought to bear on this subject. It is not the intent of this paper to match argument for argument, or to rehash the reasons for and against the military assumption of the IDEALIST Program. If, however, through lack of diligence and effort on our part these roles and assets were to be lost by

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the Agency, the impact on the Intelligence Community would be regrettable. Therefore, this paper will attempt to record only the advantages and adaptability of the IDEALIST Program to the U.S. Intelligence Community, and will tend to show the program's ability to stand above the BOB/DOD contentions for its termination. There must be sound assurances that a continuation of this program will serve the best interests of the USA.

4. It is difficult to escape the fact that the U. S. Government in the years to come will have a continuing requirement for reconnaissance of denied territory which should be attributed to non-military resources. The missions and roles of the CIA U-2's have in the past, and indeed, will in the future, be entirely separate and different from any other U. S. reconnaissance aircraft, (including the SAC U-2's). The CIA U-2's, simply stated, are required to be capable of overflying denied territory in peacetime with relative impunity. Specifically, Agency U-2's have flown in excess of 500 missions to date. Twenty-six of these were flown over the Soviet Union between 1956-1960. Fifty were flown over Cuba during the period 1960-1962. Fifty-five missions were flown in the Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia area during the period 1961-1965. The latter two cases (Cuba and Southeast Asia) clearly reflect the requirement for and the use of covert manned reconnaissance during periods preceding crisis or hostilities. It is agreed that in certain situations, such as Cuba and Southeast Asia, it is logical that the mission can and should transition to the military whenever other overt military actions dictate. Conversely, there have been in excess of 100 missions flown in other parts of the world (Nepal/Tibet/China, South America and the South Pacific, etc.), subsequent to 1960 wherein national objectives and policy did not subsequently require overt military

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involvement. There is little reason to believe that similar requirements will not be repeated in the future.

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5.

It is foregone knowledge that because of the political risk involved, peacetime overflights of any "other country" require prior approvals for the mission by highest political elements of the U. S. Government. In order to merit the political risk involved, the "fool-proof" success of any mission must be virtually guaranteed to these upper levels of the U. S. Government. Therefore, prior to soliciting these approvals, considerable efforts are expended by the CIA to adjudge the overall risk and to estimate the success factor for each IDEALIST U-2 overflight mission to meet the requirement for obtaining the maximum of intelligence information with the minimum amount of political risk and exposure.

6. These requirements explain in part the additional cost and reduced number of IDEALIST operational missions/flying hours. It is the conviction of those experienced in U-2 operations that CIA development efforts over the past few years have in fact made the IDEALIST U-2 a reasonably acceptable low risk, highly responsive and flexible reconnaissance vehicle. It further bears noting that CIA enjoys a recognized unique capability for constantly and promptly developing and adapting equipment, tactics, and operational procedures that insure the lowest level of vulnerability for overflight aircraft. IDEALIST has served in the development of many unique techniques for application of the U-2 reconnaissance system on a world-wide basis. The CIA program possesses the capability

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to operate the U-2 from aircraft carriers [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Additionally, IDEALIST has a demonstrated fast deployment posture that is responsive to crisis situations almost anywhere in the world, excluding the Soviet Union. This fast reaction capability includes the use of a variety of different support aircraft (USAF, USN, [REDACTED])

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8. In summary, and in view of the expected comparisons to be made of the CIA and SAC programs, it warrants reiterating that each program is designed to serve a specific purpose and it is more realistic to consider their relationship as complementary, and not competitive.

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[REDACTED]  
DONALD H. ROSS

Brigadier General, USAF  
Director of Special Activities

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11 August 1965

AGREEMENT FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE  
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAMA. The National Reconnaissance Program

1. The NRP is a single program, national in character, to meet the intelligence needs of the Government under a strong national leadership, for the development, management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long range for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information obtained through overflights (excluding peripheral reconnaissance operations). The potentialities of U. S. technology and all operational resources and facilities must be aggressively and imaginatively exploited to develop and operate systems for the collection of intelligence which are fully responsive to the Government's intelligence needs and objectives.

2. The National Reconnaissance Program shall be responsive directly and solely to the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board. Targeting requirements and priorities and desired frequency of coverage of both satellite and manned aircraft missions over denied areas shall continue to be the responsibility of USIB, subject to the operational approval of the 303 Committee.


## B. The Secretary of Defense will:

1. Establish the NRO as a separate agency of the DOD and will have the ultimate responsibility for the management and operation of the NRO and the NRP;

2. Choose a Director of the NRO who will report to him and be responsive to his instructions;

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3. Concur in the choice of the Deputy Director of the NRO who will report to the DNRO and be responsive to his instructions;

4. Review and have the final power to approve the NRP budget;

5. Sit with members of the Executive Committee, when necessary, to reach decisions on issues on which committee agreement could not be reached.

C. The Director of Central Intelligence will:

1. Establish the collection priorities and requirements for the targeting of NRP operations and the establishment of their frequency of coverage;

2. Review the results obtained by the NRP and recommend, if appropriate, steps for improving such results;

3. Sit as a member of the Executive Committee;

4. Review and approve the NRP budget each year;

5. Provide security policy guidance to maintain a uniform system in the whole NRP area.

D. National Reconnaissance Program Executive Committee

1. An NRP Executive Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, is hereby established to guide and participate in the formulation of the NRP through the DNRO. (The DNRO will sit with the Executive Committee but will not be a voting member.) If the Executive Committee can not agree on an issue the Secretary of Defense will be requested to sit with the Committee in discussing this issue and will arrive at a decision. The NRP Executive Committee will:

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a. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense an appropriate level of effort for the NRP in response to reconnaissance requirements provided by USIB and in the light of technical capabilities and fiscal limitations.

b. Approve or modify the consolidated National Reconnaissance Program and its budget.

c. Approve the allocation of responsibility and the corresponding funds for research and exploratory development for new systems. Funds shall be adequate to ensure that a vigorous research and exploratory development effort is achieved and maintained by the Department of Defense and CIA to design and construct new sensors to meet intelligence requirements aimed at the acquisition of intelligence data. This effort shall be carried out by both CIA and DoD.

d. Approve the allocation of development responsibilities and the corresponding funds for specific reconnaissance programs with a view to ensuring that the development, testing and production of new systems is accomplished with maximum efficiency by the component of the Government best equipped with facilities, experience and technical competence to undertake the assignment. It will also establish guidelines for collaboration between departments and for mutual support where appropriate. Assignment of responsibility for engineering development of sensor subsystems will be made to either the CIA or DoD components in accordance with the above criteria. The engineering development of all other subsystems, including spacecraft, reentry vehicles, boosters and booster interface subsystems shall in general be assigned to an Air Force component, recognizing, however, that sensors, spacecraft and reentry vehicles are integral components of a system, the development of which must proceed on a fully coordinated basis, with a view to ensuring optimum system development in support of intelligence requirements for overhead reconnaissance. To optimize the primary objective of systems development, design requirement of the sensors will be given priority in their integration within the spacecraft and reentry vehicles.

e. Assign operational responsibility for various types of manned overflight missions to CIA or DoD subject to the concurrence of the 303 Committee.

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f. Periodically review the essential features of the major program elements of the NRP.

2. The Executive Committee shall meet on the call of either the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence. All meetings will be attended by the DNRO and such staff advisors as the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence consider desirable.

E. National Reconnaissance Office.

1. To implement the NRP, the Secretary of Defense will establish the NRO as a separate operating agency of the DoD. It shall include the SOC which shall be jointly manned.

2. The Director of the NRO shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Director NRO will:

a. Subject to direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and the guidance of the Executive Committee as set forth in Section D above, have the responsibility for managing the NRO and executing the NRP.

b. Subject to review by the Executive Committee, and the provisions of Section D above, have authority to initiate, approve, modify, redirect or terminate all research and development programs in the NRP. Ensure, through appropriate recommendations to the Executive Committee for the assignment of research and development responsibilities and the allocation of funds, that the full potentialities of agencies of the Government concerned with reconnaissance are realized for the invention, improvement and development of reconnaissance systems to meet USIB requirements.

c. Have authority to require that he be kept fully and completely informed by all Agencies and Departments of the Government of all programs and activities undertaken as part of the NRP.

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d. Maintain and provide to the members of the Executive Committee records of the status of all projects, programs and activities of the NRP in the research, development, production and/or operational phases.

e. Prepare a comprehensive budget for all aspects of the National Reconnaissance Program.

f. Establish a fiscal control and accounting procedure to ensure that all funds expended in support of the National Reconnaissance Program are fully accounted for and appropriately utilized by the agencies concerned. In particular, the budget shall show separately those funds to be applied to research and exploratory design development, systems development, procurement, and operational activities. Funds expended or obligated under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence under Public Law 110 shall be administered and accounted for by CIA and will be reported to DNRO in accordance with agreed upon procedures.

g. Sit with the USIB for the matters affecting the NRP.

3. The Deputy Director NRO shall be appointed by the DCI with the concurrence of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and shall serve full time in a line position directly under the Director NRO. The Deputy Director shall act for and exercise the powers of the Director, NRO during his absence or disability.

4. The NRO shall be jointly staffed in such a fashion as to reflect the best talent appropriately available from the CIA, the three military departments and other Government agencies. The NRO staff will report to the DNRO and DDNRO and will maintain no allegiance to the originating agency or Department.

F. Initial Allocation of Program Responsibilities

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1. Responsibility for existing programs of the NRP shall be allocated as indicated in Annex A attached hereto.

(signed)  
Cyrus Vance  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

(signed)  
W. F. Raborn  
Director of Central Intelligence

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